The introduction of bioterrorism in Malaysia: A legal approach by Abdullah, Nor Anita & Abdul Rahim, Rohani
23
THE INTRODUCTION OF BIOTERRORISM IN 
MALAYSIA: A LEGAL APPROACH
Nor Anita binti Abdullah1 &
Rohani binti Abdul Rahim2
Abstract
The deliberate use of biological agents and the emergence of infectious 
diseases which can produce harm to human health and give effects 
to the public health and security are well recognised. A few years 
back, an attack of biological agents would be the most unthinkable 
situation to happen. However, the threat of bioterrorism is real and 
it is growing. It continues to be a major challenge today and the 
possibility of bioterrorism is undeniable as it is increasingly defi ned 
globally as ‘not if, but when’.  Therefore, this paper attempts to give 
a brief explanation on the threat of bioterrorism as to the emergence 
of infectious diseases and the legal history of international law on 
bioterrorism. The main objective of this paper is to fi nd out the need 
for bioterrorism law in Malaysian i.e. a legal approach. The study 
is a social legal research, which uses a qualitative approach.  Thus, 
due to lack of materials and publications in Malaysia, in order to 
achieve the objectives, the methodology used was based on a semi 
structured interviews conducted with three respected experts in 
public health and security to explore the real situation in Malaysia. 
The authors found out that the fi nding of this study had established 
that an outbreak of infectious diseases can now be viewed as a threat 
that may result to bioterrorism if there is no preparation to handle it. 
Keywords: Bioterrorism, biological agents, infectious diseases, 
legal and preparedness
Introduction
Bioterrorism started for centuries ago since biological agents have 
been used either for weapon purposes or criminal activities. Based 
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on the historical perspectives, there have been a few instances 
to confi rm in which a terrorist has used it to start warfare. There 
are many reasons why biological and toxin weapons are likely 
to become very interesting agent especially to the criminals and 
terrorist in the 21st century. The reason is due to the growth of 
biotechnology, pharmaceutical, environmental and health care 
industries where a lot of people become experts in microbiology and 
any related biosciences. The advancement of the new technology 
has increased where more people have access to expert in advance 
technology.  Most of these new technologies can be used for the 
manufacturing of biological weapons. In fact, the new technologies 
related to biological weapons are emerging rapidly. Furthermore, 
the information on how to produce the agents is easily accessible. 
It is undoubtedly creating a greater threat with severe implications 
to the public at large. Through the agents and diseases, it will be 
designed to produce for new types of weapon. This scenario is 
not a mere fi ction anymore. In fact, this is what we have to face in 
reality and it is possible due to the impact of biotechnology and also 
the production of the biological weapons from the use of the agents 
and diseases.   
The fact that a biological attack has occurred would therefore not 
become known until sometime later due to some reason where it 
may be misdiagnosed in the fi rst place. It has occurred and no doubt 
that it could occur again at any time with no expectation under any 
circumstances. There was a report made on the news of bioterrorism 
in the British Medical Association (BMA) where it stated that 
‘bioweapons that target selected ethnic groups could become a part 
of the terrorists’ arsenal…’, and ‘the threat from bioweapons has 
outstripped that from chemical and nuclear arms because of the 
riotous progress of biotechnology’.3 This statement stressed on the 
emergence of biological use as a threat due to the advancement of 
modern technologies nowadays. 
Objectives and Methodology
Undoubtedly that bioterrorism raises questions of security and 
public health as well as legal signifi cance in handling, managing, 
solving and preventing the problem. What lesson can be learnt 
3 Zalini Yunu s, “Combating and Reducing the Risk of Biological Threats,” The 
Journal of Defence and Security 1, no. 1(2010): 1
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from what had happened from the events of 11 September, 2001? 
How to arrive at an accurate picture to understand the threat and 
the spread of bioterrorism? What can and should be done to deal 
with these threats? Who should bear the responsibility? How to 
react? How law can be used as tools to prevent the emergence of 
bioterrorism? Which system is the best to be used to ensure the 
public’s safety and health?  Why would anyone use disease to cause 
death of others? These are the questions to be raised if bioterrorism 
threats become a reality and in fact, there are a lot of questions yet 
to arise. The threat is not only real, it is also growing in line with the 
world development due to advancement in biological sciences and 
technologies. Bioterrorism represents a great breakthrough to the 
public as to their response in understanding the risks and the most 
important part is how they act to reaction appropriately towards the 
event of bioterrorism whenever it occurs..  
Therefore, this paper attempts to study about the threat of 
bioterrorism and the emergence of infectious diseases that can cause 
bioterrorism if there is no further action taken. In order to complete 
this paper, the authors will enlighten the legal history of international 
law on bioterrorism to widen the understanding and knowledge 
on the emergence of bioterrorism to this world. By looking into 
Malaysian perspective, terrorism is well known among the public 
as compared to bioterrorism. Perhaps it is vital to highlight that, 
terrorism is specifi cally mentioned under Malaysian provisions such 
as provided under Penal Code, Internal Security Act 1960 (repealed 
in 2011). Thus, this paper will look into the existence of terrorism 
under Malaysian law by looking into the need for bioterrorism law 
in particular. 
In order to achieve the objectives of this paper, the authors adopted a 
socio legal study using a qualitative approach. Legal research alone 
is insuffi cient to obtain solution involving social issues pertaining to 
public health and security matter. In fact, there is no such event of 
bioterrorism yet to occur in Malaysia. Thus, due to lack of written 
materials and information in Malaysia, the authors conducted a semi 
structured interviews with three experts chosen from the relevant 
fi eld of public health and security. The experts were from Science 
and Technology Research Institute for Defense (STRIDE) under the 
Ministry of Defence, Veterinary Services Department and Tropical 
Infectious Disease Research and Education Center (TIDREC). The 
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authors provided a semi structured questions and three experts were 
assigned with a different set of questions which actually varied on 
every one of them in particular to their respected expertise. The 
purpose of assigning a different set of question was to obtain only a 
related data as needed especially on their expertise and knowledge in 
their own area and the organization in which they are representing.4 
The data collected from the interviews happened to be the most 
appropriate and helpful source of information in the completion of 
the writing of this paper. Malaysia had no experience in dealing with 
and managing the threats of bioterrorism, thus interview session 
were particularly useful for getting the real fact and information 
needed in which the authors can pursue in-depth all information 
about bioterrorism and any issue which is related to the subject. 5  
Introduction of Bioterrorism
Model State Emergency Health Power Act 2001 (Model Act) defi nes 
bioterrorism as:
‘...the intentional use of any microorganism, virus, 
infectious substance or biological product that may 
be engineered as a result of biotechnology, or any 
naturally occurring or bioengineered component of 
any such microorganism, virus, infectious substance, 
or biological product, to cause death, disease, or 
other biological malfunction in a human, an animal, 
a plant, or other living organism in order to infl uence 
the conduct of government or to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population...’.
Bioterrorism is categorised as a new form of terrorism. Nowadays, 
weapons are no longer needed to cause war to create terrorism.6 
4 Chua Yan Piew, Kaedah Penyelidikan (Kuala Lumpur: Mc Graw Hill 
Education, 2006), 116-117. See also Rohana Yusof, Penyelidikan Sains Sosial 
(Kuala Lumpur: PTS Publications, 2004), 35-37.
5 Micheal Quinn Patton, Qualitatitve Evaluation and Research Methods 2nd Ed 
(London: Sage Publications, 1990), 12-13.
6  Nor Anita Abdullah and Rohani Abdul Rahim, “Bioterrorism: New Threats 
to Health and Security.” (paper presented at the international seminar and 
workshop on terrorism, Terrorism: Redefi ning, Preventing and Combating, 
Faculty of Laws, University Brawijaya, Malang, East Java, Indonesia, June, 
24-25, 2011).
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Medical prospect turns to be effective mechanisms to achieve 
their goal to destroy and cause harm among people.7  Bioterrorism 
is defi ned as an intentional release of biological agents (bacteria, 
viruses, or other germs) to the public. The deliberate use of those 
agents is to cause disease, death, fear and panic. The threat from 
the biological agents may arise naturally when people make use of 
it and modify it to increase virulence to the public either by causing 
diseases or killing people. Thus, the availability of these agents is 
potentially to be used and exploited as biological weapon to create 
bioterrorism. The possibility of using biotechnology may have 
application to produce biological weapons through biological agents.
In order to understand the aspects of bioterrorism, it is important 
to be on familiar terms with the classifi cation of agents. Center 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has divided the agents 
which can be used as biological weapons into three categories.8 The 
categories depends on the potential effects of the agents and how 
easily the agent can spread from person to another person, what 
length it can cause illness and death to the person infected and the 
potential of each agents to cause public panic, fear and social disruption. 
Table 1 
Classifi cation of agents which can be used as biological weapo
Category Characteristics Agents/Diseases
A High priority agents include 
organism that pose a risk to 
national security because they:
- Can be easily disseminated 
or transmitted from person to 
person;
- Result in high mortality rates 
and have the potential for 
major public health impact;
- Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), 
- Botulism (Clostridium 
botulinum toxin),
- Plague (Yersinia pestis), 
- Smallpox (variola major), 
- Tularemia (Francisella 
tularensis), 
- 
(continued)
7 Albert Robida expressed his view in Le Vingtime Siecle (The Twentieth 
Century) that ‘…the times to be favorable for making medical war! …More than 
explosives as in former times, but only the artillery of outrescence, microbes of 
bacilli sent into the territory of enemy…’.
8 Centers for Disease, Control and Prevention Portal at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/
agent/agentlist.asp (accessed September 13, 2012) 
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Category Characteristics Agents/Diseases
- Might cause public panic and 
social health disruption; and
- Require special action for 
public health preparedness.
- Viral hemorrhagic fevers 
(fi loviruses [e.g., Ebola, 
Marburg] and arenaviruses 
[e.g., Lassa, Machupo])
B Second highest priority agents 
include those that:
- Are moderately easy to 
disseminate
- Result in moderate morbidity 
rates and low mortality rates; 
and
- Require specifi c 
enhancements of available 
diagnostic capacity 
and enhanced disease 
surveillance.
- Brucellosis (Brucella 
species)
- Espilon toxin of Clostridium 
perfringens
- Food safety threats (e.g 
Salmonella species, 
Escherichia coli 0157:H7, 
Shigella)
- Glanders (Burkholderia 
mallei)
- Melioidosis (Burkholderia 
pseudomallei)
- Psittacosis (Chlamydia 
psittaci)
- Q fever (Coxiella burnetti)
- Ricin toxin from Ricinus 
communis (castor beans)
- Staphy lococcal enterotoxin 
B
- Typhus fever (Rickettesia 
prowazekii)
- Viral encephalitis (alpha 
viruses [e.g Venezuelan 
equine encephalitis, eastern 
equine encephalitis, western 
equine encephalitis])
- Water safety threats 
(e.g Vibrio cholera, 
Cryptosporidium parvum)
C Third highest priority agents 
include emerging pathogens that 
could be emerging pathogens 
that could be engineered for 
mass dissemination in the future 
because of
- Availability
- Ease of production and 
dissemination; and
- Potential for high morbidity 
and mortality rates and 
major health impact.
- Emerging infectious disease 
such as Nipah virus and 
hantavirus.
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According to Table 1, Category A agents are considered the highest 
priority agents which caused the highest and greatest bioterrorism 
risk among the other categories. The diseases from the Category A 
are fairly easily disseminate to the public and also resulted to greater 
public health impact and pose a threat to national security. While for 
Category B, the agents also known as the second highest priority 
agents because the spread from this category is quite moderate as 
compared to Category B, but still causing public health impact 
with moderate rates. The last one is the agents from Category C 
as a third priority agent which bring into being the lowest risk,9 
but it can be engineered and turn out to cause greater harm to 
public health by anyone who had an intention to misuse the easy 
availability of the agents.10 Furthermore, creativity and innovation 
are becoming increasingly important for the world development 
today. Thus, by looking into the development in the modern and 
sophisticated technology which in line with the people’s creativity 
today, it provides an overview that people can do anything without 
boundaries.  The risk is everywhere and anywhere. 
In relation to the comprehensive and well developed technology, 
most of the biological agent’s production will affect the human 
life. However, it is extremely diffi cult to detect and do not cause 
illness from the fi rst day it was used until a few days later. Thus, it 
is important to know the existence of a few potential instances and 
uncertainties inherent in a biological attack:
i. A biological weapon attack is not easy to detect until victim 
begin to show the symptoms;
ii. Although the symptom shown, additional time is needed to 
identify the causative agents;
iii. It is diffi cult to determine the exact areas detected and the 
number of person exposed, to identify those exposed and to 
determine the necessary conduct to deal with;
9 Yunus, n. 3 at 5.
10 Malcolm R. Dando and Kathryn Nixdorff, “An Introduction to Biological 
Weapons,” in BWPP Biological Weapons Readers, ed. Kathryn McLaughlin 
and Kathryn Nixdorff (Geneva, 2009),8 http://www.bwpp.org/documents/
BWPP%20BW%20Reader_fi nal+.pdf  (accessed August 29, 2012) . See also 
article of “Biological and Chemical Agents”, pp. 25-26 at http://www.who.int/
csr/delibepidemics/chapter3.pdf  (accessed September 10, 2012).
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iv. It is diffi cult to vaccinate the target population (normally no 
vaccine is available for most of the agents);
v. Treatments options are limited and maybe not exist at all;
vi. The public health system are not well equipped to 
accommodate the widespread of infectious diseases caused 
by the biological attack; and
vii. The attack will cause fear and panic to the public at large.11
International Law on the Emergence of Bioterrorism
The  fi rst law used to control bioterrorism begun in 1899 known as 
Hague Convention. The fi rst prohibition of the use of biological 
agents was stated clearly in Article 23 of the Hague Convention 
which states that ‘besides the prohibitions provided by special 
Conventions, it is especially prohibited (a) to employ poison or 
poisoned arms. However, the Hague Convention 1899 was not the 
only convention forced on the prohibition of the use of biological 
agents. The latest Hague Convention which was introduced in 
1970 had also aggressively opposed the use of biological agents. 
However, the law which discussed the issue on the prohibition 
of the use of biological agents before the introduction of Hague 
Convention was introduced as early as 1921 known as the Geneva 
Protocol 1921. In the meantime, the Geneva Protocol was amended 
and fi nally, in 1925 the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the 
Use in War or Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol 1925) had 
included ‘bacteriological’ warfare with chemical prohibitions.  
Originally, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 only banned the chemical 
use of weapon in war but later it was extended to include biological 
weapon. Thus, throughout the history of law, the existence of 
biological warfare is known from the earliest time. However, the 
development of the law was not developed until recent day when 
people have a propensity to misuse the biological agents as weapon.12 
11 Ken Alibek and Catherine Lobanove, “Modulation of Innate Immunity to Protect 
Against Biological Weapon Threats,” in Microorganisms and Bioterrorism, 
ed. Burt Anderson, Herman Friedman and Mauro Bendinelli, (USA: Springer, 
2006), 57.
12 Victoria Sutton, Law and bioterrorism (USA: Carolina Academic Press, 2003), 
3-7.
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Thus, as a result, the Geneva Protocol 1925 addressed the prohibition 
of the use of biological agent as weapons. This protocol clearly 
stressed that the use of poison chemical (toxic) and diseases in war 
would be illegal according to international provisions.13  Later, re-
interpretation has been made to the Geneva Protocol 1925 in 1969 in 
Nations General Assembly which resulted to the introduction of the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and 
on their Destruction (also known as Biological Weapons Convention 
1972 (BWC)).14 
BWC acts as a fi rst multilateral disarmament of international 
and legal treaty banning the production of the entire category of 
weapons.15 Unfortunately, there were a few weaknesses and loophole 
in BWC. It did not describe clearly the verifi cation to comply with 
the terms in BWC itself. 16 Among the weaknesses of BWC is, it 
clearly stressed the provision to prohibit the use of biological agent 
as weapons but no restriction provided especially for ‘dual-use’ 
purpose.17 Under this condition, it is not surprising enough to see 
many countries violated the provisions in the fi rst place. Most of the 
13  Scott Spence and Ralf Trapp, “A Brief Comparison on Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Conventions,” in BWPP Biological Weapons Reader, ed. Kathryn 
McLaughlin and Kathryn Nixdorff (Geneva, 2009), 45. http://www.bwpp.org/
documents/BWPP%20BW%20Reader_fi nal+.pdf  (accessed August 29, 2012).
14 Spence and Trapp, “A Brief Comparison on Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Conventions,” 44.
15 BWC was opened for signature in 10 April 1972 and signed in London, 
Washington and Moscow. It was enforced in 26 March 1975 after four steps 
of re-evaluations through the conferences in 1980, 1986, 1991 and 1996. It has 
been ratifi ed by 140 countries worldwide in May, 1997. The BWC also gave 
impetus to the negotiation of a Chemical Weapons Convention in Article IX 
states ‘Each State Party to this Convention affi rms the recognized objective 
of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to 
continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement 
on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and 
stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning 
equipment and means of delivery specifi cally designed for the production or 
use of chemical agents for weapons purposes’.
16 Maurice R. Hilman, “Overview: cause and prevention in biowarfare and 
bioterrorism.” Vaccine 20,  (2002): 3055.
17 “Bio-terrorism.”  Postnote of Parliamentary Offi ce of Science and Technology, 
No. 166, (2006): 4.
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countries have their own research facilities and programmes. They 
particularly conduct a research by using the biological agents and 
existence of infectious diseases for research purposes. Their fi ndings 
and result on the research will always be questionable whether it is 
for the benefi t of mankind or vice versa. It is diffi cult to determine 
the status of the research itself because of dual-use purpose. In fact, 
some of the countries have developed their own biological weapons 
programmes. Unfortunately, there was no evidence to point them 
in violation of the BWC. Therefore, all efforts have been done to 
verify the mechanisms and it was considered as a challenge to 
BWC until today.18
The Emergence of Infectious Diseases: As Weapon
The historical lesson cautions us about the dangers of bioterrorism to 
be taken into consideration. The pandemic outbreak has been used as 
weapon for a long time ago in starting bioterrorism in the fi rst place. 
There was a long history since people using biological agents as 
weapon. During the period, it was diffi cult to determine the existence 
of infectious diseases was due to the deliberate release of biological 
agent as weapon or confounded by other naturally occurring factors 
such as the emergence of infectious diseases naturally. The most 
references throughout the history using biological weapon in Kaffa 
in 1346 which involved an outbreak of plague. Another example 
was the use of smallpox as weapon during the French and Indian war 
in 1763. During the World War 1, there was a report claiming that 
Germans used plague against Russian in 1915 and attempted to use 
cholera against Italy.19 Another history was the use of Brucella as an 
agent of biological warfare to cause bioterrorism in World War II 
due to its highly infectious. Bioterrorist would prefer to use Brucella 
because it is useful as agent for biological warfare and produced a 
long term effect and risks. It may take weeks before the exposure is 
detected. Once detected, there is no effective vaccine available in 
short time period in order to cure the effects of this infectious disease. 20 
18 Yunus, no. 3at 8-9.
19 Rebecca Katz, “Biological Weapons: a National Security Problem That Requires 
a Public Health Response.” (paper presented at the Working Paper Series 2001-
2004, Offi ce of Population Research of Princeton University (2001-2004): 6.
20 Michelle Wright Valderas & R. Martin Roop II,  “Brucella and Bioterrorism,” 
in Microorganisms and Bioterrorism, ed. Burt Anderson, Herman Friedman 
and Mauro Bendinelli (USA: Springer, 2006), 143.
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Bioterrorism was unforeseen in the fi rst place. The consequences 
exist from the biological weapons would be unimaginable. The event 
of September, 11 had killed fi ve people and infected at least thirteen 
postal servants from the attack of anthrax. Most of them inhaled the 
spores contained in the letters sent through the U.S Postal Service.21 
Until now, no one has been charged and held responsible for the act. 
It is undeniable to say that the emergence of infectious diseases had 
caused major threat to the public health as well as security system. 
It is proven that during the World War 1, disease had killed more 
soldiers than battle injuries where about 85 per cent of hospital 
admissions were for treatment of disease and only about 3 per cent 
for battle injuries.22
Furthermore, the World Health Organization (WHO) outlined 
that the emergence of infectious diseases represent a global threat 
that will require a coordinated and global response. The threat is 
considered as global because the nature of the diseases itself to 
emerge anywhere and everywhere in the planet, widespread to other 
regions.23 As stated earlier, the spread of the infectious diseases 
will involve microbes and viruses which ignore geographical 
boundaries and also involves cross border issue. The nature of the 
disease it caused among human being regardless of whether or not 
the infection is acquired naturally or being infected as a result of 
intentional exposure, both are potentially considered as a threat to 
be used as an agent for bioterrorism. 
Malaysian Overview and Legal Protection
Malaysian Experiences in Handling and Managing Emerging 
Biological Threats
Malaysian past experiences had shown that there was no event of 
bioterrorism in the sense of intentional release of biological agents as 
21 The postal workers’ reluctant to receive the vaccine may have due in part to 
the distrust and resentment that had developed over the previous months as 
government offi cial focused their treatment resources by mistakenly believing 
that anthrax could not be transmitted through unopened envelopes.
22 Anabelle Duncan, “A history of biological weapons black death & yellow rain.” 
Biological We apons Convention Regional Workshop, ed. R J Mathews, Asia 
Pacifi c Centre for Military Law. Melbourne University Law School  (2005): 23.
23 David P. Fidler, “Globalization, International Law, and Emerging Infectious Diseases,” 
Perspectives of Emerging Infectious Diseases 2, no. 2 (April-June 1996): 77.
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an act of terrorism i.e., by looking at what happened in 11 September, 
2001 or by virtue of the history which has evolved over the centuries 
in the World War I and World War II. There were no cases reported 
which resulted to the existence of the use of biological agents as 
weapon which can create the event of bioterrorism. However, 
Malaysia had its own experience in handling emerging biological 
threat through the emergence of infectious diseases such as the very 
famous Severe Acute Respiratory System (SARS) in 2003 and Nipah 
Virus in 1998. The phenomena have revealed how Malaysia handled 
and managed the threat in the very effective trial through the help 
from international collaboration. In facing the situation, Malaysia 
chose not to act in isolation. 
Thus, collaborations with WHO and IHR were taken into account as 
guidelines to be implemented in any event of an outbreak. Malaysia 
also had responded to the Global Alert which has been issued by 
WHO as fi rst precautionary enforcement towards the attack of any 
infectious diseases worldwide. In 1998, the attack of Nipah virus as 
the mysterious outbreak in the peninsular region of Malaysia had 
caught public health offi cials by surprise. Prior the attack, Malaysia 
had no experience at all in handling and managing the outbreak of 
the disease. It caused widespread panic and fear among the public. 
With the help from the collaboration of international organizations, 
Malaysia learnt much lesson theoretically and practically on how to 
manage the situations. That was a process of learning and Malaysia 
took it as a lesson in providing for a better preparedness alert in 
the event of bioterrorism, if it arises at anytime, anywhere and 
everywhere.
Based on the unpredictable event of bioterrorism as mentioned 
before, a statement pointed out by the Veterinary Offi cer,24 on which 
she stressed that most of the viruses are originated from animals 
(zoonosis). Thus, the infectious diseases which infl icted from the 
animal can easily be transmitted from animals to human or from 
human to animals. She gave an example of the emergence of Nipah 
Virus in 1998 and the outbreak resulted from person to person 
transmission which started from the sick pigs. In fact, Nipah Virus 
24  Interview with Dr. Zurin Azlin, Veterinary Offi cer at Department of Veterinary 
Services Perak on 28 February 2011.
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has a potential as an agent for bioterrorism25 (Category C in the 
List of Agents as mentioned before). This situation leads to draw an 
attention to the public not to close their eyes to any possibility of the 
event of bioterrorism. 
She further added that, the veterinary department also implemented 
normal procedures of prevention, control and preparation to prevent 
any transmission of the diseases from animals to person and to 
another person. Each implementation is different depending on 
the type of infectious diseases and the type of animal carriers of 
infectious disease. Procedures or protocols implemented are varying 
depending on the type of infectious disease and animals. For 
example, the process of ‘stamping out’ is taken to kill the animal in 
the identifi ed areas of infectious disease around one kilometer. In the 
locality of two to ten kilometers, another process of surveillance or 
monitoring will be conducted by the veterinary department. At this 
stage, samples from the animals will be taken. If the result of the test 
is positive, the animals will be killed to avoid further transmission. 
This procedure is carried out on zoonotic infectious diseases such 
as HPA1, Japanese Encephalitis (JE) and Nipah virus. The process 
continues until the infected area is declared free. In particular, the 
veterinary department has a conjunction and collaboration with 
farmers to ensure the effectiveness of the actions taken. Their 
cooperation turns to be the most effective method to implement 
prevention, control and preparation planned by the veterinary 
department.
According to the Veterinary Offi cer also, there is another process 
known as quarantine. To provide the service, the Department of 
Veterinary Service has been authorized for quarantine procedures 
on animals or birds whenever necessary. Failure to comply with 
the requirements may result in confi scation of such animals and 
consequently, the importer may be charged for penalties for the 
wrongdoings. Most of the infectious diseases are caused by zoonotic. 
Thus, quarantine is the best method applied to prevent and control the 
spread of diseases. Animal tested with contagious disease needs to 
be quarantined especially imported animals. The main purpose of the 
quarantine procedures carried out by the Department of Veterinary 
25 Lam Sai Kit, “Nipah Virus – A Potential Agent for Bioterrorism,” Antiviral 
Research 57, (2003): 113.
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Service is for the purpose of communicable disease control and for 
the export and import of animals. In fact, the quarantine process 
was established in the occurrence of infectious diseases in Perak due 
to Nipah virus attacks.26 Thus, on the initiation of strict quarantine 
procedures, adherence to appropriate biosecurity and quarantine 
procedures within facilities, as with other contagious diseases, is of 
paramount importance in preventing spread of the infection from 
other countries into our Malaysian country and vice versa. 
There are also cooperation with other government bodies such as 
Perhilitan, the Customs Department, Ministry of Home Affairs, 
Ministry of Consumer and Ministry of Health (MOH). Veterinary 
Department actually acts as a body of authority in preventing, 
controlling and preparing for any kind of possible threats of infectious 
diseases. To deal with the future unpredictable event, the help and 
collaboration with the international organisation at the international 
level had helped Malaysia learnt throughout the experiences to cope 
with the event whenever it occurs in the future. Thus, Malaysia was 
more than ready during the outbreak of SARS. For example, there 
was a professional collaboration between all parties. Furthermore, 
preparation of reference materials and guidelines on SARS on the 
clinical management on SARS were taken as an early warning for 
any detection and response to the outbreak. The public was made to 
know about the outbreak. The information of the event was disclosed 
in order to avoid any unexpected circumstances among the public or 
to rely on any rumors from unexpected sources.27 A precautionary 
measure was taken by Malaysia as advised by MOH in handling and 
managing the disease spread. Any enquires of the latest information 
and facts from the public was handled professionally especially by 
MOH in order to avoid any discrepancies later. 
Throughout the past experiences, Malaysia has not only been 
supported by WHO-IHR but support also came from the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and Food and Agriculture 
26 Interview with Dr. Zurin Azlin, Veterinary Offi cer at Department of Veterinary 
Service Perak on 28 February 2011.
27 Rohani Abdul Rahim and Nor Anita Abdullah,  “SARS Threats on Public Health 
in Malaysia: Issues and Challenges.” (paper presented at the international 
conference on Corporate Law 2009: Contemporary Roles and Challenges, 
Airlangga, Surabaya, June, 3-4, 2009).
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Organization (FAO) to strengthen international surveillance 
and detection of infectious diseases affecting human, plants and 
animals. The OIE works to make sure national Veterinary Services 
throughout the world are effective in preventing and controlling 
animal diseases.28
In addition, Tropical Infectious Diseases Research Center and 
Education (TIDREC) was established in collaboration with WHO as 
a research center to identify the emergence of infectious disease and 
discovers a method of treatment and vaccine to any potential threats 
of infectious diseases in Malaysia. TIDREC acts as a conjunction 
between the security agencies such as STRIDE and Ministry of 
Defence throughout the research on the misuse of biological agents or 
infectious disease as a biological weapon for the purpose of starting 
disruptive in Malaysia. According to the Director of TIDREC,29 
based on Malaysian experiences in handling and managing H1N1 
and SARS, it is vital to note that a research needs to be conducted on 
how to improve the level of prevention and preparedness in public 
health and security. Before this, the samples of infectious diseases 
acquired should be sent to CDC due to lack of ability and facilities to 
conduct a research. However, with the establishment of TIDREC, it 
helps the Malaysian researchers and scientists to conduct a research 
without being overly dependent to CDC anymore.
The cooperation among these organizations could also be considered 
as a contribution of BWC’s objective as Malaysia is one of the State-
Member.30 Although, in reality, there is no phenomenon that Malaysia 
does produce its own biological weapons.  However, Malaysia had 
joined the BWC to support the efforts by the international community 
at the international level and to observe the provisions in handling 
and managing the infectious diseases which has potential to be 
used as an agent for bioterrorism. Malaysia maintains its assurance 
that the BWC is essential for the maintenance of international and 
28 Interview with Dr. Zurin Azlin, Veterinary Offi cer at Department of Veterinary 
Service Perak on 28 February 2011.
29 Interview with Prof. Dr. Sazaly Abu Baker, Director of Tropical Infectious 
Diseases Research Center and Education (TIDREC) on 18 January 2012.
30 Zalini Yunus, Wong Mee Choo and Devan K. Ramu “Experiences of Malaysia 
in Implementing the Biological Weapons Convention.” Biological Weapons 
Convention Regional Workshop, edited by R J Mathews,  Asia Pacifi c Centre 
for Military Law. Melbourne University Law School  (2005):117-118.
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regional peace and security. In that sense, Malaysia is committed 
to undertake all possible efforts to fulfi ll its obligations under the 
BWC.31 
According to Science and Techn ology Research Institute for 
Defense (STRIDE) under the Ministry of Defence, efforts have 
been done to ensure the implementation of BWC.32 In line with the 
implementation of BWC, Malaysia had enacted its own Act known 
as Chemical Convention Act 2005. This Act actually covers the 
prohibition of the use of chemical as prohibited item and also as 
chemical weapon. Currently, there is no specifi c Act pertaining to the 
prohibition of the use of biological weapon in Malaysia. However, to 
show that Malaysia has an effort to comply with the implementation 
as provided under BWC, the Mala ysian Draft of Biological Weapon 
and Toxin Convention is currently debated in order to undertake the 
obligation of BWC specifi cally. 
Protection and Measures: Legal Provisions
Malaysian Federal-state relations are governed by Part VI of the 
Federal Constitution. There are three lists, the Federal List, the State 
List and the Concurrent List, listed in the Ninth Schedule.33  The 
Federal List sets out those subjects on which only Parliament can 
legislate. While the State List sets out those subject on which only 
the State Legislative Assemblies can legislate and the Concurrent 
List sets out the subjects on which either Federal or State may 
31 Article IV of the BWC requires States Party, in accordance with their 
constitutional processes, to “…take any necessary measures to prohibit and 
prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the 
agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specifi ed in Article 
I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or 
under its control anywhere”
32 Interview with Dr. Zalini Yunus, Head of Human Factors, Protection and 
Biophysical Technology Division, Science and Technology Research Institute 
for Defence (STRIDE), Ministry of Defence, on 27 December 2011. 
33 See Article 74 clause (1) of the Malaysian Federal Constitution, which states 
that ‘Without prejudice to any power to make laws conferred on it by any 
other Article, Parliament may make laws with respect to any of the matters 
enumerated in the Federal List or the Concurrent List (that is to say, the First or 
Third List set out in the Ninth Schedule).
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legislate.34 In the matter of public health, it is listed under List III, 
the Concurrent List in the Ninth Schedule of the Act implying that 
either state or federal may legislate upon the issue. However, as a 
matter of fact, health issues involve the most expensive expenses. 
In order to enforce and protect the public health, either state or 
federal may legislate. Thus, it should be taken into consideration 
in certain circumstances where federal has the most authoritative 
power to legislate.35 Therefore, it should be listed under the Federal 
List matter where federal administration will look into the matter.
Looking into this issue, the fi fth Malaysian Prime Minister, Datuk 
Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi did emphasize that Malaysia should 
always beware and prepare an effective mechanism to protect 
Malaysian citizens from any biological disaster in the future. He 
stressed on the issue of infectious diseases which nowadays have 
ignored geographical and national boundaries. Furthermore, the 
increase of globalization in the area of biotechnology industry is 
creating a situation in which a terrorist group could possibly acquire 
biological agents, equipment or weapons through various approaches 
includes through the emergence of infectious diseases.36 With 
reference to that, currently, there is no specifi c legislation in Malaysia 
to criminalize the person who use or produce biological weapon to 
cause threat and harm to the public. Thus, if there is a case involving 
any kind of criminal use and production of biological weapon in 
Malaysia, no law will specifi cally govern the offence.  It is clear that 
in criminal aspect, Malaysia has the Penal Code as domestic law to 
enable the perpetrator of such offences to be prosecuted according 
to Malaysian criminal law. Unfortunately, there is no provision with 
regards to the protection of the threats to the public in the events 
of bioterrorism. No provision is specifi cally provided for under the 
Penal Code to protect any act of crimes relating to public health. 
34 Andrew Harding, Law , Government and the Constitution in Malaysia, (Kuala 
Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal, 1996), 168.
35 Rohani Abdul Rahim and Nor Anita Abdulllah “Bioterrorism: Is There Any 
Legal Protection.” (paper presented at the national conference on Law and 
Technology 2008, Faculty of Laws, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Palm 
Garden Hotel, Putrajaya, December, 18-19, 2008).
36 An opening remark by Tun Abdullah Badawi in the International Conference 
on “Biosafety and Biosecurity Asia 2007.”  Putra World Trade Center, 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia  (21 – 22 May 2007) http://www.pmo.gov.my/
ucapan/?m=p&p=paklah&id=3097 (accessed September 10, 2011).
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The Penal Code only concerns about the criminalization of man 
towards man.  When it comes to any offences relating to the use of 
biological agents as biological weapons, it seems that there is no 
legal indication to protect man towards the harms cause However, 
looking at the event of September 11, 2001 at World Trade Center, 
United States of America, Malaysia has taken serious precautionary 
measures toward oncoming threat especially when it involves the 
biological threats which will cause bioterrorism. In fact, the threat of 
terrorism encountered by the world today affects all nations and so 
far, it had reached impact not only to the national security, but also 
to the health stability of the country. Thus, Malaysia reiterates its 
commitment to fi ght against terrorism whereby Malaysia strongly 
believes that efforts should be focused on the prevention and 
brainpower among law enforcement agencies. Early emphasis on 
the discovery and effi cient efforts to deal with the underlying causes 
of terrorism should be done as a preparation.  As a result, Malaysia 
had amended the Penal Code in 2003 by enacting terrorism as a 
criminal offence which has been discussed under Chapter VIA 
(Section 130B – Section 130T).37 The following defi nitions of a 
‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorist act’ have been brought in the Penal Code to 
classify the offences as ‘any person who (a) commits, or attempts 
to commit any terrorist act; or (b) participates in or facilitates the 
commission of any terrorist act.38 
Anothe r act which also involves terrorism as a criminal offence 
is being in possession of corrosive and explosive substance and 
the carrying of offensive weapons. This is provided for under the 
Corrosive and Explosive Substance and Offensive Weapons Act 
1958. According to the Act, ‘offensive weapons’ includes any 
instruments which is used as weapon of offence is likely to cause 
hurt and ‘scheduled weapon’ means any offensive weapon specifi ed 
in the Second Schedule.39 Nothing herein mentioned the protection 
of public in the event of the use of biological agent as a weapon. The 
provisions are too general. It does not involve any use of biological 
37 Edmund Bon Soon Tai, “Impact of Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Measures 
in Asia: Malaysia,” Malaysian Bar, 2004, p. 2. http://www.malaysianbar.org.
my/human_rights/impact_of_terrorism_and_anti_terrorism_measures_in_
asiamalaysia.html (accessed September 25, 2012) 
38 See Section 130B (1) of the Penal Code of Malaysia.
39 See Section 2 of the Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive 
Weapons Act 1958.
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weapons which can spread the infectious diseases to the public. 
However, from the introduction of a new Act which is known as the 
Strategic Trade Act 2010, a defi nition of ‘biological weapon’40 has 
been defi ned. The term ‘biological weapon’ currently acts as a new 
approach in defi ning and introducing weapon in Malaysia legally. 
This Act is actually the most recent provision which is introduced 
to control over the export, transshipment, transit and brokering 
of strategic items, including arms and related material and other 
activities which may involve the development and production of 
weapons of mass destructions in Malaysia. Thus, the legal defi nition 
introduced has proven to raise the Malaysian legal awareness and 
preparedness about the threat of the use of biological agents as 
biological weapon. 
Legal Approach: Managing the Threat of Infectious Diseases
Preventi on and Control of Infectious Disease Act 1988 (PCIDA) is 
the only Act available in Malaysia governing infectious diseases. 
The core function of the Act is to be used in the prevention of 
importation of infectious diseases and the control of the spread of 
the infectious diseases whenever it occurs either in Malaysia or 
outside Malaysia. In order to achieve the objective of prevention 
and control of infectious diseases, collaboration is made between 
Malaysia and International Health Regulation (IHR) under World 
Health Organization (WHO) as most of other countries in the 
world. As to the protection of importation of infectious diseases 
that might be dangerous to the public health in Malaysia, Part III, 
states that ‘whenever notifi cation is received under the IHR that an 
infected area exists outside Malaysia, the Minister may by order in 
the Gazette declare such area to be an infected area for the purpose 
of the Act’.41 Thus, whatever notifi cation received under the IHR 
which affect other countries outside Malaysia will be declared as an 
infected area in order to prevent the infectious diseases spread into 
40 See Section 2 of the Strategic Trade Act 2010, the defi nition of ‘biological 
weapons’ as ‘any microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever 
their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have 
no justifi cation for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purpose, and 
weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use biological agents or 
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed confl ict’.
41 See Section 6 of the Prevention and Control of Infectious Disease Act 1988.
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Malaysia.42 For example, when H1N1 outbreak attacked Malaysia 
in 2009, the mode of notifi cation of the outbreak was important. 
Based on the notifi cation given by the fi rst party who knew about the 
outbreak (normally doctors and physicians), the authorised authority 
could take appropriate measures to control the spread.43 In fact, 
PCIDA is seen as a positive method used in controlling the outbreak 
from spreading. If the infected area occurs in Malaysia, the place 
will be declared as infected area. These provisions may be regarded 
as one of the protections given to the public in ensuring the public 
health safety in the event of any attack of infectious diseases which 
potentially cause bioterrorism. 
PCIDA also provides other alternatives and suggestions in ensuring 
the diseases which is likely to spread to the public such as to 
quarantine or isolation as provided under Part IV, which states that 
‘an authorized offi cer may cause any person who is infected or 
whom he has reason to believe to be infected to be removed to a 
quarantine station for treatment and may detain the person at the 
station until he can be discharged without danger to the public’.44 
In that case, any infected person or suspects must be separated from 
the public in order to avoid any mass infection. Enforcement will be 
taken into consideration in preventing the infectious diseases from 
spread to the public at large.
By looking into the legal provisions provided above, a question may 
arise with regards to the adequacy of such laws itself in protecting 
public health in the event of biological threats. Therefore, it is 
true to say that our country in the present time has no such special 
laws or adequate laws to deal with the immediate problems45 of 
bioterrorism as in the case of biological attacks where it may spread 
42 Failure to notify of the H1N1 constitutes an offence under the PCIDA, 
where upon conviction, the offender is liable in respect of a fi rst offence, to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fi ne or to both; in 
respect of a second or subsequent offence, to imprisonment not exceeding fi ve 
years or to a fi ne or to both; and in respect of a continuing offence, to a further 
fi ne not exceeding RM200 for every day during which such offence continues. 
43 Nuraisyah Chua Abdullah, “Infl uenza A H1N1: Strategies and Legal Responsi-
bilities of Hoteliers, Air Carriers, Travel Agents and Tour Operators,” Malayan 
Law Journal Article 5 [MLJ] (2009): lvi, p. 5.
44 See Section 14 of the Prevention and Control of Infectious Disease Act 1988.
45 Harding, n. 35 at 166.
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without anyone realizing and as a consequence, it may cause a major 
destruction not only to the public health, but to the national security 
as well.
Findings 
The prior debate about the reality of bioterrorism was highlighted 
for a long time. It was suggested that the origin of bioterrorism may 
exist naturally through the emergence of infectious diseases, agents 
and viruses which are readily available in open sources.  Otherwise, 
it may emerge intentionally through the act of terrorists by misusing 
the accessibility and availability of the biological agents as weapon. 
Furthermore, the effects of bioterrorism to spread only can be 
detected after quite some time. It may take a week before the actual 
symptoms of bioterrorism can be determined, and to wait until the 
confi rmation by the medical experts. In such circumstances, it is 
very diffi cult for the parties involved to take action to deal with the 
matter from the beginning of the existence of the infectious diseases. 
Based on the interviews carried out with the three relevant experts 
in this area, all of them agreed that the emergence of bioterrorism in 
Malaysia was undeniable. The fact that Malaysia is having its own 
experience in facing various types of infectious diseases such as 
SARS, H1N1, Nipah Virus and others, and the subsistence of these 
diseases operate as a contributor to the threat of bioterrorism and the 
most important point is, most of these diseases are animal diseases. 
In fact, the diseases may occur naturally or by intentional means. 
The possibility of the emergence of the diseases as an act that will 
lead to the occurrence of bioterrorism, and it seems to introduce a 
new dimension of threat today. 
Moreover, the statement can also be proven through the existence 
of a strong partnership and cooperation between Malaysian and 
international organisation in public health matter such as WHO-IHR, 
CDC, OIE and FAO. International organisation plays an important 
role to ensure the protection to the worldwide community. The 
establishment of TIDREC itself as a research center for a tropical 
disease also proved that Malaysia is seriously taking the threat of 
bioterrorism that will possibly incur risks to the public health and 
national security. Besides that, a discussion towards the possibility 
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of the agents misuse has led to the introduction of Malaysian Draft 
of Biological Weapon and Toxin Convention. Malaysia is not only a 
dormant member of BWC, but at the same time it is trying to show 
its commitment to undertake the provisions under BWC. 
Biological threats also had raised new concerns about national 
security throughout the world. Therefore, the question now is 
whether the Malaysian government is aware about the impending 
threat likely to be caused by biological agents or weapons. As a 
result of the Draft of Biological Weapon and Toxin Convention, it 
has undoubtedly raised Malaysian awareness and concern towards 
the threats. However, there are a lot of things to be taken into 
consideration as a matter of preparedness and prevention in the event 
of bioterrorism. Thus, the issue of introducing a specifi c law on 
bioterrorism should be made clear. The main purpose of introducing 
the law on bioterrorism is to cope with the administrative and legal 
protection in Malaysian legal approach. It should be designed to 
meet the critical need in Malaysian security system as well as public 
health matter in case if bioterrorism threats become a reality. As a 
turning point, based on the earlier discussion, Malaysia experienced 
the risk of the threat of terrorism from the event of September 
11.  The phenomena had widely opened the eyes of the world to 
always be prepared and respond to the fear of bioterrorism. After 
the event, the signal is crystal clear as to what degree of disaster 
it was signaling since it has already occurred in USA. Thus, what 
Malaysia has learnt since the event is the amendment to the Penal 
Code in 2003 to include ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorism-related offences’46 
and the latest is the existence of Strategic Trade Act 2010 which 
defi nes ‘biological weapon’.47 However, according to these two Acts 
which have actually discussed in part the issue of bioterrorism seem 
not to be appropriate and thus insuffi cient to deal with the global 
threats caused by biological agents or weapons. In fact, the issue 
of bioterrorism covers a different perspective of public health and 
national security matters. An effort to deal with the issue has brought 
greater attention from the beginning especially in enlightening 
the area of public health and security functions such as infectious 
diseases surveillance as response to the emergence threats.
46 Chapter VIA (Section 130B-Section 130T) of the Penal Code of Malaysia. 
47 See Section 2 of the Strategic Trade Act 2010.
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The scope of the potential impact resulted from the emergence of 
infectious diseases should be taken into consideration on how it 
will affect the life of people. There is no doubt that bioterrorism has 
penetrated an infl uence relationship between infectious diseases and 
the scope of public health and security. Clearly, people in the society 
should get ready to deal with the threats whenever it occurs.   
Conclusion
Although most concerns of bioterrorism focus on the human threat, 
it may result to a similar threat to livestock or crops. There is a link 
and inter-relation between human, animals and plants. An important 
part is the diffi culties to differentiate between the natural occurrence 
and intentional introduction of the infectious diseases. Furthermore, 
the principle of responding and preventing the infectious diseases 
would seem to apply to natural occurring these so-called infectious 
diseases and also the intentional introduction of the diseases. 
The prospects of having to deal with the biological threats or the 
occurrence of infectious diseases that will cause bioterrorism are 
not fi ction anymore. Considering what has happened since the event 
of September, 11, it becomes reasonable and normal to feel anxious 
about the risk posed by bioterrorism activities as far as issues of 
public health and security are concerned. 
Bioterrorism highlights the challenges in the public health and 
security functions. In fact, bioterrorism is primarily a federal issue, 
not a state issue. Thus, any actions taken to prevent and to respond 
to the threats of bioterrorism should be a federal priority. To act in 
response, cooperation between public health and security with legal 
enforcement will operate as a prerequisite solution in bioterrorism 
planning and response. The public health and security threats caused 
by bioterrorism requires a well functioning legal enforcement 
mechanism in place that would play a proactive role in combating as 
well as responding to any threats of biological attack.  
The comprehensive preparedness can only be proven from effective 
and appropriate mechanisms i.e. availability of specifi c laws, etc. The 
Malaysian government as well as the public must play an effective 
role in the fi ght against bioterrorism.  We have to remember that 
the suggestion to prevent and respond to bioterrorism activities in 
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a Malaysian context somehow presents unique complexities among 
the public at large i.e. in understanding how serious is the situation 
if in case we are faced with some threats as a result of bioterrorism. 
Thus, it is not only a matter to be discussed from a scientifi c 
perspective among the scientist’s background and professionals. 
Furthermore, public health issue specifi cally public health law has 
always been neglected since centuries ago. The event of bioterrorism 
would also constitute a grave threat to the function of laws as 
human legal protection. In that sense, it is the best suggestion to 
focus on the link between public health and the law to act as major 
legal protection to the public health at large as well as security 
concerns. 
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